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Abstract
Systems that pursue their own goals in shared
environments can indirectly affect one an-
other in unanticipated ways, such that the ac-
tions of other systems can interfere with goal-
achievement. As humans have evolved to achieve
goals despite interference from others in soci-
ety, we thus endow socially situated agents with
the capacity for social action as a means of
mitigating interference in co-existing systems.
We demonstrate that behavioural and evolution-
ary volatility caused by indirect interactions of
goal-rational agents can be reduced by design-
ing agents in a more socially-sensitive manner.
We therefore challenge the assumption that de-
signers of intelligent systems typically make, that
goal-rationality is sufficient for achieving goals in
shared environments.
1 Introduction
Socio-technical systems are comprised of many
interacting components, where decisions are be-
ing increasingly delegated from humans to so-
called ‘intelligent’ machines. These machines
typically act in reference to a given goal, such
as an objective function, utility or goal-state –
which may often conflict with other entities in
the system [49]. Yet, humans have evolved both
social intelligence and social self-awareness to ex-
press more complex behaviour than purely goal-
rational action in order to succeed in highly social
environments, driven by factors such as values,
emotions and traditions [1,23,35,91]. Despite the
fact that components in a socio-technical system
are inherently socially situated, they are typically
limited to performing goal-rational actions and
thus only very rudimentary social action. Specif-
ically, they do not perceive or reason about the
effect other systems can have on their own abil-
ity to learn and evolve, or the capabilities of oth-
ers around them; the actions that they direct to-
wards others are also not driven by any broader
social meaning – unlike in humans [7,30]. These
systems are also unaware of their own impact on
the world around them, which can have a catas-
trophic and unpredictable effect. In 2010 for ex-
ample, a $1 trillion stock market crash occurred
in just 36 minutes, caused at least in part by
the unforeseen interactions of several automated
trading agents [85].
Socio-technical systems such as vehicular net-
works [31], smart energy grids [62], and trad-
ing agents [18] are increasingly being designed
to operate in dynamic, uncertain and social en-
vironments, where interactions are potentially
unanticipated or unknown. Explicit and antici-
pated interactions can be designed for when inte-
grating systems, however, neglecting to consider
potentially unintended interactions with others
that are co-located can lead to worse perfor-
mance [89]. [37] argue that as the complexity
of these inherently social systems of systems in-
creases, the number of implicit and unintended
interactions between the systems will also in-
crease as a consequence; further, it is not only the
interactions with other systems that makes the
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task of runtime integration challenging, but also
as [61] points out – both the intended and un-
intended interactions with humans as well. The
field of self-improving system integration aims to
design systems that overcome these issues – with-
out full knowledge, control or authority over the
other systems in which they coexist and inter-
act with [6]. The actions of one system can have
an unintended effect on the others surrounding
it [9]; a transition to more socially intelligent
systems that are able to learn about others in
their environment is therefore necessary to not
only enable systems to self-integrate with others
around them at runtime, but to maintain learnt
knowledge and goal-achieving behaviour despite
interference from others.
More broadly, as we delegate more decisions
to intelligent machines, we posit that capturing
elements of evolved human social behaviour
will be increasingly important; here, social
action and social self-awareness are two essential
aspects that so far remain largely unexplored.
Human societies have no global knowledge or
central point of control; how then, do humans
interact effectively? Organic Computing ap-
proaches this by observing and controlling a
group of interacting, self-organising entities [59];
we however take a microsociological approach,
as a step towards socially intelligent systems
capable of self-awareness at the individual level.
Humans have evolved the ability to achieve goals
in complex social systems by considering others
and acting socially; we thus operationalise
social action theory [91] in socially situated
agents that pursue individual goals in shared
environments with less volatility than current
systems. We operationalise two types of social
action – traditional action is acting similarly
to the rest of the population, and goal-rational
action is seen in current systems, where the
most effective action to achieve a goal is taken.
We also introduce random action, which adds
randomness into the behaviour of agents by way
of Random Immigrants [19]. The need to act in a
socially-sensitive way challenges the assumption
that goal rationality is sufficient for agents
to achieve goals, when they operate in shared
environments with less than complete knowledge.
The experiments use the River Crossing
Dilemma as a testbed [4], which was designed to
explore arbitrarily complex problems in shared
environments. Firstly we explore the impact
that interference has on agents that are able
to achieve individual goals alone, to assess how
learnt knowledge is maintained. We then gen-
eralise these results over a large number of ex-
periments for agents that begin evolution with
no prior knowledge. We finally draw conclusions
to compare the volatility of evolution with each
type of social action, and whether goal-achieving
behaviour can therefore be learnt and maintained
despite interference.
2 Background and Related
Work
2.1 Evolution of Sociality in Hu-
mans and Animals
We as humans have evolved the ability to nav-
igate and utilise our social environments to our
advantage. Social learning can be seen in both
humans and the animal world alike, enabling us
to learn and do more complex things than we
would be able to individually [87]; it has also
been shown to be favoured over individual learn-
ing when environmental change is slow, or when
individual learning or non-social and environ-
mental cues are not useful [55, 65]. Our innate
capacity for cooperation over competition and
thus our ability to learn from others has been
attributed to our success as a species, and to
what distinguishes the complexity of our cogni-
tive abilities from that of primates [33,38,57].
The cultural intelligence and cultural brain hy-
potheses posit that species that have evolved to
favour social learning consequently evolve im-
proved asocial learning and individual problem-
solving skills, and flexibility, adaptability and
innovation in learning compared to non-social
species; this results in a more intelligent pop-
ulation overall [5, 12, 32, 60, 79, 87]. The social
brain hypothesis supports this, postulating that
social abilities were favoured and acted as a driv-
ing force during evolution; this is said to have
led to an increase in brain size to support cog-
nitive ability and intelligence, where neocortex
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size correlates with group size in humans and pri-
mates [1, 14, 28,42].
[43] provide supporting evidence for this hy-
pothesis by showing a positive correlation be-
tween the size of the mushroom bodies of ants (a
higher brain centre like the neocortex in mam-
malian brains) and colony size. Sociality in ants
and other eusocial insects however differs to that
of primates; the neural mechanisms driving in-
sect sociality remain relatively unknown [43,51],
but recent efforts explore how this can be ad-
dressed in the future [77].
The success of social learning and behaviour
in humans and animals alike has inspired many
Computer Science researchers. These observa-
tions and theories from nature have been widely
used to create optimisation algorithms and to
design systems with emergent collective intelli-
gence. For example, self-organisation and coop-
eration in ants and bees have inspired the de-
velopment of many optimisation algorithms [17,
26, 44]. Swarm robotics is inspired by the co-
operation in groups of social animals to achieve
goals or complete tasks, where robots cooperate
to solve more complex tasks collectively [13, 58];
this has also been used for societally impor-
tant tasks such as search and rescue [3]. So-
cial learning strategies have also been widely ex-
plored [41, 65], taking inspiration from processes
such as mimicry, imitation and learning from oth-
ers [63, 69,73].
2.2 Sociality in Agents
Individuals in collective systems are inher-
ently socially situated - their actions affect
others around them either directly, or indi-
rectly through the environment. Pursuing self-
interested action in a social setting can lead
to collective irrationality [45]; however, social-
ity through self-organising institutions can en-
able groups of self-interested individuals to gov-
ern themselves, supporting sustainable manage-
ment of common pool resources [66]. Social dy-
namics have been widely explored in areas such
as game theory, sociology, economics and evolu-
tionary computation [45,48,83,86].
Agents may pursue common or individual
goals when sharing an environment. Argumen-
tation, negotiation and persuasion [80], goal-
aware team affiliation [29], norms and obliga-
tions [24], social plans and joint intentions [40,
68], and mutual influence detection [71] all pro-
mote cooperative behaviour in multi-agent sys-
tems, attempting to mitigate interference be-
tween goal-pursuing agents. The BDI (beliefs-
desires-intentions) agent architecture for exam-
ple enables agents to reason about norms and
obligations that they are explicitly aware of to
promote cooperative behaviour [24]. Other re-
search explores deliberative normative agents,
which require explicit knowledge of others, as
well as the norms that exist in order to delib-
erately adhere to or violate them [16].
Systems that intentionally cooperate, coordi-
nate, or act socially, require social awareness [7],
and are capable of perceiving and reasoning
about others. The evolution of cooperation has
been explored extensively, with social dilemmas
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Snow-
drift Game used to explore social dynamics and
strategies [2, 11, 25, 45]. Although this study ex-
plores agents that may evolve to cooperate, pro-
moting cooperation is not the focus of this pa-
per. Rather, our questions concern the impact
of coexistence and interference on the ability to
achieve individual goals, when agents are unable
to learn of the existence, goals or intentions of
others; knowledge of all others in a system would
enable perfect coordination, but is infeasible in
dynamic environments due to the infinite power
needed for processing and reasoning [40]. Not
only this, but information about other systems
or entities in dynamic or uncertain environments
may not be available at design-time – includ-
ing their goals, capabilities and how to integrate
with them. If a system cannot perceive or learn
about potentially unknown others, or the effect
that their actions can have on itself, interference
can affect how goals are achieved in ways that
cannot be understood; without a mechanism to
overcome interference and unanticipated events
beyond their control, systems will be unable to
make appropriate decisions at runtime in accor-
dance with their goals. It is therefore neces-
sary to move towards socially situated systems
with the capacity for social awareness, by equip-
ping them first with the ability to maintain goal-
achieving behaviour despite unanticipated inter-
ference from other systems.
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2.3 Interference in Multi-Agent
Systems
The term interference has been used to describe
the interaction between entities in a shared envi-
ronment, arising from the competition for shared
resources [72]. Interference is an inherent charac-
teristic of a shared world; it can arise from enti-
ties directly interacting with each other, or indi-
rectly by interacting with the environment which
acts as a passive entity [15, 27]. The pursuit of
goals in a shared world is said to be a core com-
ponent of sociality [15]; social dynamics such as
cooperation and competition are the result of in-
terference from entities that help (positive inter-
ference) or hinder (negative interference) others
with respect to their goals. Other research how-
ever states that interference is purely the nega-
tive effect on an entity’s goal-driven behaviour
[53]; here, the term implicit cooperation is anal-
ogous to positive interference. In this work, we
adopt the broader definition of interference which
encompasses both the positive and negative ef-
fects.
[15] describes dependence as a special case
of interference, where interference is so strong
that entities become dependent on the actions
of others to achieve their goals, and thus can-
not achieve their goals through their own ac-
tions alone. Other researchers have explored the
concept of interference with different terminol-
ogy. [40] describes this as an interdependence of
actions that arises when the actions of entities are
related, or have an impact on others. [27] states
that co-existing robots will have social interac-
tions that can be indirect, as their actions will
influence and affect others around them. [71] ex-
plore how to detect mutual influences that arise
in smart camera networks, and the resulting de-
pendencies. [82] explore interference within a sin-
gle agent ; internal interference can arise from
conflicting actions necessary to fulfil parallel con-
flicting goals (e.g. an action is a step towards
achieving one goal, but a step away from achiev-
ing another, conflicting goal).
These methods require agents to be aware of
others in the environment, and potentially their
goals or intentions. In unpredictable and dy-
namic environments, this is not always possible;
the environment and the agents within it may
change over time, so this information may not
always be available or predictable at design-time.
[84] identify that subsystems can influence one
another either directly or indirectly, whether
they are intended to interact together or not;
consequently, the ‘interwoven’ nature of these
systems where uncertainty, heterogeneity of
entities and interference between said entities
prevail means that traditional methods of
integration become impractical [8]. Thus, agents
in dynamic or uncertain environments, where
the presence of others is potentially unknown,
need the ability to develop and maintain these
models on-the-fly. Endowing systems with the
ability to learn from their inherently social
environment, as human societies have evolved
to do, could therefore enable them to learn
and evolve potentially more complex individual
behaviours, problem-solving competencies, and
goal-achieving abilities.
This work extends that of [4], and explores
the volatility and maintenance of goal-achieving
behaviour in agents that experience interference
when they have no models of others in the en-
vironment, as a prerequisite to social aware-
ness in systems. Specifically, we conduct fur-
ther experiments to explore and generalise the
effects that both goal-rational and traditional ac-
tion, as well as random action, have on expected
fitness and volatility in learning on a broader
scale. With this, we aim to distinguish the dif-
ferences between goal-rational and traditional ac-
tion, and additionally investigate whether these
approaches are quantitatively different to intro-
ducing Random Immigrants into the population
[19] – a mechanism widely in dynamic optimisa-
tion problems and those with dynamic environ-
ments to add diversity to populations in genetic
algorithms [34,47,75,93,97].
An important distinction between this work
and that of the work it is extended from is a
change in terminology. [4] explored the instabil-
ity in evolution caused by interference, whereas
in this work we investigate the volatility in evo-
lution as a result of interference. This change in
terminology was influenced by the additional sta-
tistical analysis that has been conducted in this
work; three newly defined metrics have been pro-
posed and used to capture different elements of
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volatility in evolution, which were inspired and
adapted from the established historical volatility
metric used in financial modelling and volatility
forecasting [67]. These metrics capture the dis-
persion of values over time. We also conduct an
analysis of how the expected fitness changes de-
pending on the type of action used, and whether
agents are socially situated or not, as well as a
deeper analysis into the results in the original
work [4]. Finally, we analyse the trade-off that
exists between fitness and volatility for the three
different types of action operationalised in this
work.
3 Inspiration from the The-
ory of Social Action
Interference means that actions can have unin-
tended or unanticipated consequences on both
the actor and others in shared, complex and dy-
namic environments [54], making shared and in-
dividual goals more difficult to achieve. Humans
overcome these issues by acting socially and not
purely individualistically in social environments.
Many computer science researchers have there-
fore been inspired by theories of psychology, so-
ciology and cognitive science, such as in organic
computing [59], self-awareness [46,50], and social
dilemmas, social learning, altruism and agent so-
cieties [39, 41, 64, 90]. It thus seems logical to
draw parallels between the exploration of human
social phenomena in sociology and socially situ-
ated agents.
3.1 Outlining Terminology
To explore social concepts in agents, one must
first adopt and define the relevant terminology.
[68] define ‘situated agents’ as those that are
resource-bound, operate within and continuously
interact with dynamic environments, and bal-
ance reactivity with deliberation. [52] use the
term ‘social situatedness’ to include both the so-
cial and cultural aspects of being situated in an
environment, which affect the behavioural and
cognitive processes of the agents that are situ-
ated within. This is influenced by the theories
of [88], such that the social aspects of environ-
ments that agents are situated in affect the in-
dividual intelligence of the agents. [21] describes
socially situated agents to be those that not only
gather information from their physical environ-
ment, but from the social component of it as
well. We therefore term the agents in this work
as socially situated due to their operation in a dy-
namic and shared environment; their behaviour
can interfere [15] with the actions and goals of
others, and what they learn is influenced by their
physical and social environment – whether they
are aware of it or not.
As previously stated, socially situated agents
experience interference and can consequently be
capable of social action. [91] define social actions
as those being oriented towards and consider-
ing the behaviour of others; they hold meaning,
which refers to the motivation from the actor’s
perspective. Actions with inanimate objects do
not involve other actors and are thus not social.
Additionally, actions that have no meaning, i.e.
those without motivation or deliberation, are not
actions, but merely behaviours. To further dis-
tinguish between these concepts, [81] proposes a
hierarchy of social action; we explore social ac-
tion as defined by these terms. A subset of this
hierarchy is outlined below:
• Behaviour is automatic, reactive and reflex-
ive.
• Action is intentional and purposive, with
meaning to the actor.
• Social Behaviour holds no meaning to the
actor. It is reactive, therefore no deliber-
ation occurs. A behaviour becomes social
when it is directed or oriented towards an-
other.
• Social Action holds meaning to the actor,
and is intentional. A rational decision is
made to act in a certain way, taking into
account different factors such as the actor’s
emotional state and the current situation.
An action becomes social when it is directed
or oriented towards another.
• Social Interaction requires a response to a
social action from another actor.
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3.2 Ideal Types of Social Action
Social action theory, as outlined by [91], defines
four ‘idealtypus’ of social action; these ideal
types describe the motivations behind social
actions in a simplified model, to aid analysis of
complex human actions.
Instrumental-Rational Actions, often
termed goal-rational actions, are those chosen
for their effectiveness in achieving a goal, and
are justifiable from the perspective of the actor.
Other goals, the range of possible actions,
and the consequences of performing the action
are considered to decide the most appropriate
action. An example is planning the actions
necessary in order to reach long-term goals.
Most agents, especially in machine learning, are
instrumental-rational by this definition.
Value-Rational Actions are determined
by the values or beliefs held by an actor, such
that performing the action itself carries meaning
rather than the result of it. Actions are ratio-
nalised in terms of ethical or religious beliefs, or
to any cause valued by the actor. Rationality
is a justifiable, conscious decision of how to
act, and is understandable when considering
the motivations of the actor; actions may seem
irrational to outside observers if the motivation
is not immediately clear. Pure value-rational
action disregards any consequence, such as a
soldier sacrificing himself for another; here, the
value held outweighs the consequence of the
action.
Affective Actions are reactive and impulsive
actions in response to an emotional state or
exceptional stimulus. Affective action appears
inherently irrational, as the consequences of the
action may not be considered and thus may
be difficult to justify. An example is striking
someone out of rage.
Traditional Actions are habitual, or those
in reference to a cultural custom; it can there-
fore be seen as acting in a way that others act.
These actions can be described as mindless, au-
tomatic, or ritualistic; there is no obligation to
act in this way, rather the rationalisation for per-
forming the action is that ‘it has always been
done this way’. An example is using specific eat-
ing utensils; deliberation reduces over time as the
action becomes second nature. Traditional ac-
tions therefore might not necessarily be optimal
or most appropriate in terms of achieving a goal,
but can be adequate means to satisfy the end.
3.3 Social Action in Computa-
tional Systems
Computational systems with actions determined
by error-function-based learning or objective-
function-based search are goal-rational; they are
engineered to maximise their ability to achieve a
particular goal. However, this paper shows that
there are unintended consequences associated
with the actions of goal-rational agents that
coexist in a shared world. This can manifest as
volatility in evolution and a loss of ability to
achieve one’s own goals. Human evolution has
favoured social behaviour to deal with issues
arising from living in the presence of others [76];
without this, humans struggle to adapt or
survive [20]. We explore how computational
systems may also begin to overcome these
issues by operationalising other ideal types of
social action, combined with the goal-rationality
already present in current systems.
Social action can be operationalised in differ-
ent ways. Traditional action could simply be
copying what most others are doing, forming tra-
ditions over time. Value-rational action would
become especially critical when systems make de-
cisions on behalf of humans; this poses the ques-
tion of how one can trust that the decisions made
align with human values. Affective action could
be taken when one does not know how to pro-
ceed in an unencountered situation; as such, all
actions may be irrational unless abstracting pre-
vious knowledge.
This work explores the notion of traditional
social action and its effect on goal-achievement
in socially situated agents. It is operationalised
as an action derived from a representative state
of the population at specific points in time. As
such, to align with the definition of ‘social action’
stated previously, a social action here is oriented
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towards the others in the population in terms
of the evolutionary process, and not the other
agents that may exist within the environment.
We thus operationalise two types of social action
as inspired by [91] (goal-rational and traditional),
and introduce ‘random social action’, which adds
Random Immigrants to the population [19]. To
this end, we can observe whether social action
within the evolutionary process is a useful tool
to mitigate the effect of interference without an
explicit awareness of what is causing it (i.e. other
agents in the environment), as a step towards
socially self-aware agents – and whether doing
so is quantitatively different to adding Random
Immigrants.
4 The River Crossing
Dilemma:
A Shared-Environment
Testbed for Social Agents
The experiments in this work use the River
Crossing Dilemma as a testbed [4], extended
from the River Crossing Task [70]; this is an
extensible, gamified grid-world environment, de-
signed to explore how interference affects learn-
ing and the ability to achieve goals in socially
situated agents.
4.1 The River Crossing Task
The River Crossing Task (RCT) is a 2D grid-
world problem designed to explore how agents
learn to solve complex tasks with no a priori
knowledge of the task or environment. It is there-
fore impossible for agents to plan a sequence
of actions – they must react to dynamic ele-
ments and previously unseen environments on
the fly [70]. An RCT instance comprises an n×n
grid, with a river of Water. An agent’s goal is to
retrieve the Resource from the opposite side of
the river, which provides a large positive fitness.
Conversely, falling in the river provides a large
negative fitness. Agents must therefore learn to
achieve sub-goals such as building a bridge with
Stones to cross the river safely to achieve their
goal.
4.2 The River Crossing Dilemma
The River Crossing Dilemma (RCD) extends the
original RCT to facilitate the exploration of so-
cial situations with multiple agents [4]. These
may be tractable social dilemmas, such as in
this paper, but in general are not constrained
in their complexity, since RCD instances may be
designed to be arbitrarily complex. The RCD is
a 19×19 grid with a two cell deep river of Water
(Figure 1); a bridge is successfully built if two
Stones are placed in the same space in the river.
An agent’s individual goal is to collect both of
its allocated Resources – one from either side of
the river. The RCD reduces the number of ob-
jects in the environment compared to the original
RCT [70]; extra objects such as Traps increase
the complexity of the task at hand, without af-
fecting interference. Agents therefore only en-
counter the objects that are sufficient to achieve
their goals.
Figure 1: The River Crossing Dilemma: A Gamified
Shared Environment for Studying Social Agents [4]
The RCD is gamified through introducing a
cost for placing Stones in the river, inspired
by the Snowdrift Game [56] (also known as the
Chicken Game [45, 48, 86] or the Hawk-Dove
Game [74]); this is a two-person social dilemma
with a cost for cooperation. Gamification adds
a subtle complexity to the task as agents must
learn to endure a small cost for a large gain. An













To calculate the payoff p for agent i with Equa-
tion 1, ri is how many Resources that agent i has
collected, N is the total number of Resources to
collect per agent to achieve their individual goal,
C is the cost of placing a Stone in the river and si
is the number of Stones that agent i has placed in
the river. C and N are constants, with C = 0.1
and N = 2. fi = 1 if the agent falls in the river,
and is otherwise 0. The cost of placing Stones in-
creases as more are placed, encouraging agents to
exert the least effort to achieve their goal. This
equation evaluates each agent’s payoff individ-
ually – independent of others; this also allows
agents to learn alone in the environment.
Table 1 shows a simplified payoff matrix us-
ing Equation 1. The highest payoff when alone
is pi = 0.7 as two Stones must be placed. In
shared environments, agents can receive a payoff
of pi = 1.0 by exploiting the other, who re-
ceives pi = 0.7. The overall optimal payoff is
pi = 0.9 when agents cooperate by sharing the
cost of building a bridge.
Agent 1
Agent 2
S2 = 0 S2 = 1 S2 = 2


















Table 1: Payoff Matrix, where Si is the number of Stones
placed by agent i
Cooperation in social dilemmas is influenced
by knowing of its existence [22], and can be neg-
atively influenced if the dilemma’s characteristics
are unknown or dynamic [86]; this is an inherent
feature of a shared environment. Therefore, co-
operation is challenging and cannot be intended
when agents are unaware of the existence of oth-
ers or the consequent interference. It must be
noted that the focus of this paper is not the evo-
lution of cooperation, but rather how agents can
mitigate the effect of interference when socially
situated; cooperation or competition can emerge,
however is not intended nor understood by the
agents.
4.3 Agent Design
Existing approaches to agent design for the orig-
inal RCT use a two-layered neural network ar-
chitecture and neuroevolution as a learning al-
gorithm. These agents are capable of reacting
to dynamic environments (such as a change in
environment size or configuration) without need-
ing a priori knowledge [10,70,78]. Our approach
for RCD agent design uses a two-layered neural
network architecture [4], inspired by [70].
The deliberative layer is a fully-connected neu-
ral network that generates high-level sub-goals;
the input layer has six neurons, the hidden layer
has four neurons, and the output layer has three
neurons which represent sub-goals (Figure 2). In-
puts correlate to the agent’s current state and the
state of its environment: Grass, Resource, Water
or Stone, if it is Carrying a Stone and if a partial
Bridge exists in the environment (i.e. one Stone
in the river). The deliberative network outputs
values that correspond to sub-goals, i.e. what to
do next. These values are 1 for attraction, 0 for
neutrality or −1 for avoidance, and are generated
for Resources, Stones and Water.
BCSWRG
WSR
Figure 2: Deliberative Neural Network for Generating
Sub-Goals: Inputs: Grass, Resource, Water, Stone, Car-
rying Status, Partial Bridge Built; Outputs: Resource,
Stone, Water
The reactive layer generates a dynamic activ-
ity landscape through a topologically-organised
n × n lattice of neurons, corresponding to the
RCD dimensions; this is used to hill-climb to-
wards current sub-goals. The method of acti-
vation propagation is inspired by the shunting
model proposed by [94, 95], characterised by a
biologically-inspired equation [36]. This is used
to calculate the activity of each neuron based on
its own activation and the activity surrounding
it (Equation 2), for each time-step. A represents
the passive decay rate, xi is the current neuron,
I is the Iota value of the neuron (corresponding
to the sub-goals from the deliberative layer: for a
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value of 1, I = 15, for a value of −1, I = −15 and
I = 0 otherwise), wij is the weight between neu-
rons xi and xj where xj is one of the surrounding
cells in xi’s Moore neighbourhood (indicated by
k = 8), and [xj]
+ is calculated by max(0, xj) –
meaning that negative activity cannot propagate
through the network. The Iota value is a large
number to create hills and valleys in the activ-
ity landscape, as inspired by the original RCT
testbed designed by [70]. An example of an acti-
vation landscape that is generated by the reactive
layer, using Equation 2, is presented in Figure 3.
dxi
dt





Figure 3: Activation Landscape Generated by the Reac-
tive Layer: The reactive layer generates dynamic activ-
ity landscapes based on the current sub-goals; here, the
sub-goals are [−1, 1,−1], meaning the agent is attracted
to Stones and avoids Resources and Water. The activity
landscape maps to the physical landscape (Figure 1), and
agents are thus able to hill-climb towards their sub-goals
whilst avoiding repulsive objects, by traversing the activ-
ity landscape and moving to the adjacent cell with the
highest value.
4.4 Experimental Setup
Previous work using the RCT testbed has
demonstrated that agents are able to solve tasks
in dynamic configurations of the environment,
by expressing both reactive and deliberative be-
haviours [70]. Whilst the experiments outlined in
this paper use a static configuration of the RCD
testbed depicted in Figure 1, the agent architec-
ture used is inspired by [70], and thus agents are
expected to be capable of solving dynamic con-
figurations of the RCD environment as well. The
experiments in this paper use the following com-
mon parameters to operationalise goal-rational
action, inspired by previous work [4, 10,70].
A population of 25 randomly initialised agents
was evolved with a Steady State Genetic Algo-
rithm. At each generation, three agents from
the population were randomly selected to com-
pete in a tournament, where they were given 500
time-steps to solve the task in the RCD. The
worst-performing agent in the tournament was
replaced by the offspring of the winners. The
offspring that was generated had a probability of
Pone = 0.95 to inherit a whole chromosome (each
neuron’s connection weights) from a random par-
ent, otherwise single-point crossover was used;
this was repeated for each chromosome. Each
weight w in the resulting offspring was then mu-
tated by a random value from a Gaussian distri-
bution with mean µ = w and variance σ = 0.01.
This represents the goal-rationality seen in cur-
rent systems. Thus, agents do not learn within
their lifetime, but on an evolutionary basis.
4.5 Experimental Design
Agents were evolved for either 500,000 genera-
tions when alone, or 1,500,000 generations when
socially situated. This is to give each agent an
adequate amount of time to explore the search
space; the effects of interference tend to be seen
over a long period of time, thus socially situ-
ated agents are evolved for longer than those that
evolve alone. Where agents are evolved together,
two separate populations are maintained.
The first part of the study explores the ef-
fects of both goal-rational and traditional action
on evolution in agents that exist either alone
or in a shared environment. The first set of
experiments in Section 5 explored whether ten
randomly-initialised agents were able to achieve
individual goals with goal-rational action; these
evolved alone for 500,000 generations.
The effect of interference was then explored in
a further two sets of experiments, which observed
whether agents were able to continue to achieve
goals either with or without continued evolution
in a shared environment. In Section 6.1, the
ten evolved agents from the first set of exper-
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Section Action Type Learning Type Agents Generations Runs
5 Goal-Rational Learning Alone 1 500,000 10
6.1 Goal-Rational No Ongoing Learning 2 500,000 10
6.2 Goal-Rational Ongoing Learning 2 1,500,000 30
7.1 Goal-Rational & Traditional Ongoing Learning 2 1,500,000 30
Table 2: Experiment breakdown for the initial part of the study, outlining the section number the experiments are
presented in, the type of action used, the type of evolution, the number of agents in the environment, the number of
generations, and the number of times the experiment was repeated.
iments were randomly arranged into ten pairs
to observe the effects of interference over the
course of 500,000 generations; these agents ini-
tially evolved alone for 500,000 generations (Sec-
tion 5), and continue to act in a shared envi-
ronment for a further 500,000 without further
evolution. Section 6.2 then arranged the same
ten agents into 30 random pairs; these pairs
were evolved together in shared environments
for 1,500,000 generations after their initial pe-
riod of evolving alone, to observe whether goal-
achieving behaviour can be maintained despite
interference.
Section 7.1 compares goal-rational action
(Section 6.2) with the introduction of traditional
action in the same 30 pairs of agents. These
were evolved for 1,500,000 generations after the
initial period of evolving alone. The design for
the experiments thus far is summarised in Table
2.
Traditional action is then explored on a
broader scale in Section 7.3; 100 goal-rational
agents were initialised with random weights, and
were evolved with and without traditional action
in both individual and social environments. To
ensure the results in shared environments were
not biased against a particular agent, agents were
assigned a randomly-generated partner. The
agents were evolved for 500,000 generations if
they were alone, and 1,500,000 generations if so-
cially situated.
Section 8 finally ascertains whether traditional
action is quantitatively different to the introduc-
tion of Random Immigrants [19], as adding ran-
domness is a common way to improve popula-
tion diversity during evolution. The same 100
agents were evolved with random action in both
individual and social environments. Finally, we
analyse the trade-off between fitness and volatil-
ity observed for the three types of social action.
Sec Action Type Agents Gens Runs
7.3 Goal-Rational 1 (1G) 500000 100
7.3 Goal-Rational 2 (2G) 1500000 100
7.3 Goal-Rational & Traditional 1 (1GT) 500000 100
7.3 Goal-Rational & Traditional 2 (2GT) 1500000 100
8 Goal-Rational & Random 1 (1GR) 500000 100
8 Goal-Rational & Random 2 (2GR) 1500000 100
Table 3: Experiment breakdown for the final part of the
study, outlining the section number the experiments are
presented in, the type of action used, the number of agents
in the environment, the number of generations, and the
number of times the experiment was repeated. Each ex-
periment starts with the same 100 randomly initialised
agents.




The notion of social action has been opera-
tionalised in this work within the evolutionary
process. Here, a social action is oriented towards
others in the population in terms of the evolu-
tionary algorithm, rather than other agents that
may exist in the environment. Specifically, the
offspring produced at each generation is depen-
dent on the type of action used.
Traditional action is operationalised as follows;
at each generation, there is a 90% chance for
the worst-performer of each tournament to be
replaced by the current goal-rational offspring of
the best two parents, and a 10% chance for it to
be replaced with an offspring that is a represen-
tative state of the population. This is captured
with the calculated median of all weights in the
deliberative layer across all agents in the popu-
lation; traditions can potentially be established
that fluctuate as the population evolves.
Random action is operationalised similarly to
traditional action. At each generation, there
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is a 10% chance for the worst-performer of the
tournament to be replaced with an agent with
a randomly-initialised set of weights, and a 90%
chance for it to be replaced with the standard
goal-rational offspring as defined in Section 4.4.
The replacement probability of 10% in the case
of both traditional and random action is in line
with the method used by [4]. Preliminary in-
vestigation of varying replacement probabilities
showed that little effect or benefit was seen with
a probability lower than 10%; forming and main-
taining traditions is more difficult with lower re-
placement probabilities, as solutions have little
time to influence the population. Further, higher
probabilities such as 20% or 30% showed that
the population became saturated and diversity
was reduced, meaning that it was increasingly
difficult for evolution to explore the fitness land-
scape. Especially in the case of random action,
higher probabilities of replacement start to re-
semble random search.
4.7 Metrics and Statistical Tests
Three metrics have been devised to analyse the
evolution, fitness and learning in agents using the
three types of action; each metric captures differ-
ent knowledge, and therefore complements the
others.
Historical volatility is a common metric used in
financial modelling and volatility forecasting that
captures the dispersion of values over time, calcu-
lated most commonly by the sample standard de-
viation over a defined time period [67]. A higher
volatility here means that there is a higher vari-
ability and dispersion of the values [92]. This is a
useful metric to determine the expected volatil-
ity in fitness over time across all 100 agents in
Sections 7.3 and 8; to differentiate this from the
other volatility metrics used, we term this the
Standard Deviation over Time (SDoT).
The Cumulative Absolute Change over Time
(CACoT) metric captures the magnitude of the
changes in fitness across all 100 agents; the count
is incremented by the absolute change in fitness
between generation gi−1 and gi. A high CACoT
therefore indicates that fitness fluctuates by large
amounts.
The Count of Change over Time (CCoT)
metric captures how often the fitness changes
across all 100 agents; this increments by one only
if the fitness in generation gi is not equal to gi−1.
A high CCoT indicates frequent fluctuations in
fitness, without capturing the magnitude. Both
CACoT and CCoT therefore capture knowledge
gain and loss (fitness increase/decrease).
According to [96], the Shapiro-Wilk normal-
ity test is powerful for distributions that are sus-
pected to be asymmetric, as well as those that
are symmetric with both high and low kurtosis
values; for this reason, this test was chosen over
other normality and goodness-of-fit tests such
as the Cramr-von-Mises and chi-squared tests.
As such, a Shapiro-Wilk normality test was con-
ducted for each of the SDoT, CACoT and CCoT
distributions for each experiment in Sections 7.3
and 8. Results were significant for each with a
p-value below 0.05, indicating that the distribu-
tions are non-normal. Wilcoxon Signed Rank
tests were therefore used to compare the effect
each action type had on evolution. These are
non-parametric tests used to compare the medi-
ans of two paired distributions; the null hypoth-
esis for two-tailed tests is that the medians are
identical, whereas one-tailed tests compare the
directional difference in the distribution means.
One two-sided (x 6= y) and two one-sided tests
(x > y, and x < y) were conducted. The four sta-
tistical moments (mean, variance, skewness and
kurtosis) and the median were also calculated for
each distribution for further comparison.
5 Learning Alone with
Goal-Rationality
Agents do not experience interference when they
are in an environment alone. As such, they can
achieve individual goals with independent aso-
cial learning with goal-rational action. Figure 4
depicts the fitness of a single agent during evolu-
tion, showing that the agent can learn to achieve
its goal.
5.1 Results
Whilst not impossible to achieve, this task ini-
tially appears difficult to solve simply because
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Figure 4: Agent F can achieve its goals when alone in
an environment; it initially learns to collect one Resource
to get a fitness of 0.5, then to build a bridge to achieve its
goal around generation 50,000, giving it a fitness of 0.7
Figure 5: Average Population Fitness of 10 Agents
Evolving Alone: All ten agents that evolved alone sus-
tained the behaviours necessary to achieve their goal by
generation 50,000
the fitness function does not ‘lead’ agents to-
wards their goals with incremental rewards;
agents encounter a very large, neutral network
landscape during evolution as a result. In
each experiment, goal-achieving behaviours were
maintained once learnt. Figure 5 shows the aver-
age fitness of ten agent populations during evo-
lution. Random mutations during breeding peri-
odically create agents with lower fitnesses, which
may fall in the river for example, thus reduc-
ing the fitness average. These ten, individually
evolved agents are henceforth labelled Agents A
through J.
5.2 Implications
Goal-rational action enables agents to evolve and
maintain goal-achieving behaviour when they
evolve alone; this can therefore be compared to
evolving socially situated agents, to observe the
effect of interference on learning.
6 Coexistence and
Volatility
Interference from the actions of others causes
learnt knowledge to become unreliable, result-
ing in goal-rational agents behaving differently.
The ten agents in the previous section are then
observed in shared environments both without
(Section 6.1) and with (Section 6.2) continued
evolution.
6.1 Results: Coexistence Without
Ongoing Evolution
Three emergent dynamics are observed in these
non-evolutionary experiments: one agent ex-
ploits the other for a higher payoff (Figure 6a);
both agents co-exist and achieve their goals sim-
ilarly to when they are alone (Figure 6b); one
or both agents cannot achieve their goals (Fig-
ure 6c). Interference can change the world view
of the agents, and consequently change their ex-
pected behaviour and fitness. As the results
are dependent on the interactions with a spe-
cific partner, graphing an average of all ten ex-
periments would mask the specific interactions.
A representative sample of three experiments
showing average population fitnesses are there-
fore shown in Figure 6.
The fitnesses fluctuate based on the actions
of both individuals at every generation, and as
such appear very volatile. Emergent exploita-
tion has no long-term implication here as agents
do not learn; agents would continue to achieve
their goals as before if they were again alone in
an environment. The critical observation here is
that interference causes the agents’ world view
to change in unanticipated ways, thus affecting
their ability to achieve goals.
6.2 Results: Coexistence with
Ongoing Evolution
Interference can affect learnt and reliable knowl-
edge, and thus an agent’s ability to solve tasks
independently – even when interaction is not di-
rect. The most commonly observed emergent dy-
namic when agents continue to evolve together

















































































Moving Average Fitness of Agents B and F
Without Ongoing Evolution
Figure 6: The moving average fitness of Agent B and
Agents (a) H, (b) G and (c) F, without ongoing evolu-
tion. When socially situated with different pairs, Agent
B (a) exploits Agent H to receive a higher average fit-
ness from not exerting as much effort, (b) is more unpre-
dictable than when alone, and is often unable to achieve
its goal, and (c) cannot achieve its goal. In each exper-






































Best in Population Fitness of Agents B and F
with Ongoing Evolution and Traditional Action
Figure 7: Agents B and F continuing to evolve together
(a) without and (b) with traditional action. (a) Without
traditional action, Agent B exploits Agent F and can-
not achieve its goals alone; evolution is volatile as agents
evolve to be codependent. Cooperation gives 0.9 fitness.
If fitness < 0.7, agents do not achieve their goals. (b)
With traditional action, the agents endure a smaller pe-




S = 0 S = 1 S = 2
R = 0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
R = 1 0.5 0.4 0.2
R = 2 1.0 0.9 0.7
Table 4: Commonly observed agent behaviours and the
resulting fitnesses
payoff at another’s expense. No pair of agents
were observed to both maintain their ability to
achieve goals alone – at least one agent was ob-
served to change its learnt behaviour. Figures 7a
to 11a depict the best fitness in each popula-
tion for the named agents, to show that learnt
knowledge can be lost with coevolution. Table 4
shows common fitnesses and their associated be-
haviours.
Figure 7a shows the most extreme case of in-
terference observed; agents evolved to be code-
pendent, as what agents learn depends on the
actions of the other. Both endure periods of be-
ing unable to achieve their goals (a fitness be-
low 0.7), with Agent B being more negatively
affected than Agent F. The brief period of coop-
eration is volatile as Agent F is unreliable; Agent
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B thus evolves to rely on itself to achieve its
goals. The highest fitness for Agent B continu-
ously fluctuates between 0.9 (cooperation, plac-
ing one Stone and collecting two Resources) and
0.4 (placing one Stone but only collecting one Re-
source); this volatility leads to exploitation. One
can thus postulate that the effect of interference
can be great, complex and uncertain as the world
changes in unanticipated ways.
Periodic dips in fitness lead to exploitation
(Figure 8a). Exploitation in early evolution leads
to a mutual loss of fitness and inability to achieve
goals, which evolves into an exploitative relation-
ship. The spikes observed in Agent D’s fitness in-
dicate that occasionally Agent F will cooperate,
but is unreliable and predictably self-interested.
As a result, Agent D sustains its independent be-
haviour, whilst Agent F evolves to capitalise on
this.
Figure 9a shows an initial period of coopera-
tion between Agents D and G. Agent G evolves
to exploit, and Agent D evolves to be indepen-
dent as the actions of Agent G are not predictable
enough to make cooperation beneficial.
Figures 10a and 11a show exploitative rela-
tionships; the remainder of the 30 experiments
are similar. As with Figure 8a, peaks in the ex-
ploited agent’s fitness indicate that the exploita-
tive agent occasionally helps to build a bridge; it
however evolves to be independent as the other
agent is not predictable enough to rely on. This,
again, evidences that interference affects how and
what behaviours are evolved and maintained dur-
ing evolution.
6.3 Implications
Learnt knowledge becomes unreliable when
agents pursue individual goals with goal-rational
action in shared environments. Interference from
the actions of others changes each agent’s per-
ception of the world, and often leads to volatile
evolution and knowledge loss; if agents cannot
perceive the cause of the environmental changes,
they will attempt to adapt and often lose learnt
knowledge as a result. Exploitative agents for ex-
ample depend on the other to achieve their goals,
and thus ‘forget’ how to interact with Stones over
time; this would be detrimental if they became





































Best in Population Fitness of Agents D and F
with Ongoing Evolution and Traditional Action
Figure 8: Agents D and F continuing to evolve together
(a) without and (b) with traditional action. (a) Without
traditional action, both agents initially lose their abil-
ity to achieve goals, with a fitness of 0.5; Agent F then
evolves to exploit Agent D. (b) With traditional action,
the agents endure less knowledge loss with traditional ac-






































Best in Population Fitness of Agents D and G
with Ongoing Evolution and Traditional Action
Figure 9: Agents D and G continuing to evolve together
(a) without and (b) with traditional action. (a) Without
traditional action, Agent G cannot always rely on Agent
D to exploit it, so it sometimes cooperates; Agent D can-
not rely on G to cooperate, so evolves to achieve its goals
alone. (b) With traditional action, the agents are able to






































Best in Population Fitness of Agents J and C
with Ongoing Evolution and Traditional Action
Figure 10: Agents J and C continuing to evolve together
(a) without and (b) with traditional action. (a) With-
out traditional action, Agent C exploits Agent J, which
evolves to achieve goals alone. (b) With traditional ac-
tion, the agents endure low fitness temporarily with tra-






































Best in Population Fitness of Agents E and F
with Ongoing Evolution and Traditional Action
Figure 11: Agents E and F continuing to evolve to-
gether (a) without and (b) with traditional action. (a)
Without traditional action, Agent F exploits Agent E,
which evolves to achieve goals alone. (b) With traditional
action, Agent F still evolves to exploit Agent E.
evolved to be codependent rather than indepen-
dent.
Further, the unanticipated and imperceptible
actions of the other agent change the state of the
environment, and can cause agents to alter their
knowledge and behaviour in an attempt to adapt
to the change in circumstances. This can lead to
a change in the mapping of inputs to sub-goals in
the deliberative layer, and may result in drastic
changes of behaviour. Specific examples could
be an agent suddenly falling into the river due
to an inability to cope with the environmental
changes appropriately, or an agent that simply
places many Stones into the river as its sub-goals
have been altered to be repulsed from Resources.
Interference can therefore impair an agent’s abil-
ity to achieve its goal, even though it was once
capable of being successful. An inability to over-
come unexpected situations and unanticipated
changes means agents are susceptible to knowl-
edge loss and changes in behaviour. We opera-
tionalise traditional action in an attempt to mit-
igate the effect of interference in goal-rational,
socially situated agents.
7 Traditional Action Can
Promote Less Volatile
Learning
Motivated by the behavioural changes observed
in socially situated agents, traditional action was
compared to goal-rational action to explore how
coevolution and interference were affected. As a
result, socially situated agents evolved in a more
predictable and less volatile manner.
7.1 Results
Figures 7a and 7b depict the same pair of goal-
rational agents with ongoing evolution, without
and with traditional action respectively. The
volatility seen in Figure 7a is drastically reduced
with traditional action (Figure 7b). Further, the
period of knowledge loss endured by Agent B
as it learns about its new environment is much
shorter; additionally, both agents receive a mu-
tual benefit from the presence of the other such
that they evolve and maintain emergent cooper-
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ative behaviours. This enables both agents to
achieve their goals with the best overall payoff.
Figures 8a and 8b also present the same pair
of agents. Traditional action significantly re-
duces the initial period that agents are unable
to achieve their goals; instead of a dip in fit-
ness, agents briefly cooperate instead. Agent F
then evolves to exploit Agent D, which is ob-
served both with and without traditional action.
Traditional action is beneficial overall for these
agents.
Figures 9a and 9b demonstrate that cooper-
ation can exist with exploitation. Fluctuations
between fitnesses of 0.9 and 1.0 in Agent G indi-
cate that it cannot rely on the other agent, and
therefore must still maintain knowledge of how
to build a bridge. Agent D is more independent,
and fluctuates between a fitness of 0.7 and 0.9;
Agent D cannot always rely on Agent G to coop-
erate, so maintains its ability to achieve its goal
alone. Cooperation is maintained for longer with
traditional action, so agents are therefore gener-
ally much better off.
Figures 10a and 10b show exploitative be-
haviour; however, employing traditional action
causes a period of around 100,000 generations
where both agents lose fitness from losing the
ability to build bridges, thus only collecting one
Resource each with a payoff of 0.5. Agent C
evolves to exploit Agent J; when its behaviour
changes such that it cannot achieve its goal, nei-
ther can Agent C. This anomalous evolutionary
event causes a temporary dip in fitness that is
not observed without traditional action. Fur-
thermore, traditional action enables the agents
to overcome this dip in fitness, indicating that
agents can potentially learn how to cope with
unexpected events.
Figures 11a and 11b show that traditional ac-
tion can have a minimal effect on evolution.
In the remaining experiments, if pure goal-
rational agents evolve to be exploitative, tradi-
tional agents will as well. Exploitative agents
essentially unlearn their previously dependable
knowledge; this change in behaviour is simply
caused by the interference that arises from coex-
istence.
7.2 Implications
Traditional action can reduce the effect of inter-
ference on agent evolution and goal-achievement.
Whilst intentional cooperation requires an ex-
plicit awareness of others [15], unintentional,
emergent cooperation can be observed when
agents receive a mutual benefit from the actions
of the other; this enables them to pursue their
own goals and achieve a better fitness overall.
Additionally, coexisting agents are observed to
evolve and maintain their expected behaviours
faster with traditional action, allowing them to
recover from unforeseen events or states.
7.3 Analysing the Effect of Tradi-
tional Action on Interference
The effect of interference can be explored on a
broader scale. As outlined in Section 4.5, 100
agent populations were initialised with random
weights, used to explore how goal-rational agents
evolved both with and without traditional action,
in individual and social environments.
Over the 100 experiments, agents using tradi-
tional action were observed to have the same or
a lower median SDoT, CACoT and CCoT than
their purely goal-rational counterparts, which
can be seen in Figure 12. Agents using tradi-
tional action thus typically have a lower volatil-
ity in evolution than purely goal-rational agents.
The difference in volatility measured by the three
metrics is much larger in socially situated agents
than agents that are alone in an environment;
fitness with or without traditional action is not
significantly different when agents do not expe-
rience interference.
Agents using traditional action typically have
an SDoT with less variability than those that do
not (Table 5); this is more evident when agents
exist alone, than when they are socially situated.
Combined with a lower expected SDoT, and
more skew and excess positive kurtosis (kexcess =
k − 3), agents using traditional action are ex-
pected to have a lower and more predictable
SDoT. Kurtosis is used to analyse the tailedness
and probability of outliers.
When alone, agents that use traditional action
have a CACoT and CCoT with a higher vari-




G GT GR G GT GR
mean 0.01545549 0.01254882 0.04222212 0.05888082 0.04236362 0.03868761
variance 0.001083114 0.0008872677 0.0003943957 0.006211676 0.00474367 0.000329736
skewness 1.835432 2.166065 0.1707893 1.286178 1.752168 0.329795
kurtosis 4.562028 5.946412 2.740262 3.351055 5.035609 3.637307
median 0.0 0.0 0.041909 0.010199 0.003317 0.040580





























































































Figure 12: Log-scale box plots of the (a) SDoT, (b) CA-
CoT and (c) CCoT, of agents using goal-rational or tradi-
tional action, evolved together or alone (2G, 2GT, 1G and
1GT respectively). All points above (Q3 + 1.5IQR) are
classed as mild outliers, whereas those above (Q3+3IQR)
are extreme outliers; in all cases, there were no outliers
below (Q1−1.5IQR). All data points – including all out-
liers, indicated with a black circle – are used in the analy-
sis. Note that the boxplots are on a log scale. Traditional
action makes evolution less volatile than goal-rational ac-
tion when agents are together. Volatility is similar when
agents are alone, so the type of action used makes little
difference.
CACoT and CCoT than those that do not (Ta-
bles 6 and 7). This changes when agents are
socially situated, with traditional action reduc-
ing the variability and kurtosis in CACoT and
CCoT. This shows that traditional action can
reduce volatility in evolution when agents expe-
rience interference. Agents that use traditional
action typically have a lower CACoT than those
that do not, indicated by a greater skewness; this
is the same for the CCoT in agents that use tra-
ditional action when alone. The expected CCoT
and skewness of the CCoT are lower in socially
situated agents that use traditional action than
those that do not, meaning fluctuations in fitness
are typically reduced.
It is not surprising that the type of action used
does not significantly affect the expected SDoT,
CACoT and CCoT when agents are alone; they
do not experience interference and thus the envi-
ronment is more predictable (Table 8). However,
when agents are socially situated and experience
interference, goal-rational agents have a signifi-
cantly higher SDoT and CCoT; traditional ac-
tion in socially situated agents therefore reduces
volatility in evolution compared to goal-rational
action alone.
Table 9 presents further information about the
SDoT, CACoT and CCoT of each experiment,
including the minimum and maximum value as
well as the quartiles. Table 10 then presents an
analysis of the outliers in the data, including the
median and mean of the outliers. The median
and mean of the outliers are generally higher in
agents using goal-rational action – both when
agents act alone and when together – compared
to those that also use traditional action. This is
especially evident for the CACoT and CCoT for
when agents act together; saying this, the me-
dian of the outliers of the CACoT and CCoT is
marginally lower when agents use goal-rational




G GT GR G GT GR
mean 1.374 1.33 2.276 38.348 27.173 1001.674
variance 9.46962 12.8302 2.365479 10840.82 7419.292 1694746
skewness 5.430996 7.385912 1.433599 5.066438 5.186799 1.073078
kurtosis 34.39726 62.88242 5.654775 32.85393 31.60225 2.824496
median 0.5 0.5 1.9 4.6 2.7 85.1
Table 6: CACoT Statistical Moments and Median
Moment
Alone Together
G GT GR G GT GR
mean 5.37 5.15 9.88 150.08 64.44 4556.34
variance 236.7405 320.7551 59.13697 215319.4 33005.91 37515029
skewness 5.430996 7.385912 1.433599 6.216094 4.630009 1.108448
kurtosis 34.39726 62.88242 5.654775 48.31377 26.21253 2.847056
median 1.0 1.0 8.0 10.0 7.5 187.5
Table 7: CCoT Statistical Moments
Test
SDoT CACoT CCoT
Alone Together Alone Together Alone Together
G 6= GT 0.4282 0.04565 0.7669 0.192 0.7426 0.0978
G < GT 0.7885 0.9774 0.62 0.9046 0.6322 0.9515
G > GT 0.2141 0.02283 0.3835 0.09601 0.3713 0.0489
Table 8: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistical Tests Comparing Goal-Rational with Goal-Rational and Traditional
Action (G-GT). Results are p-values; significant results (p < .05) are bold
Metric Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max IQR
SDoT
2G 0 0.001122 0.010199 0.058881 0.088579 0.24805 0.087457
2GT 0 0.00108 0.003317 0.042364 0.069555 0.24989 0.068475
1G 0 0 0 0.015455 0.00301 0.099989 0.00301
1GT 0 0 0 0.012549 0.001523 0.099676 0.001523
CACoT
2G 0.5 1.5 4.6 38.348 27.45 798.9 25.95
2GT 0.5 1.5 2.7 27.173 9.3 588 7.8
1G 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.374 0.7 22.3 0.2
1GT 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.33 0.7 32.9 0.2
CCoT
2G 1 4 10 150.08 94 3967 90
2GT 1 3 7.5 64.44 29.75 1176 26.75
1G 1 1 1 5.37 2 110 1
1GT 1 1 1 5.15 2 163 1
Table 9: The minimum, maximum, first and third quartiles, median, mean and interquartile range (IQR) for the
SDoT, CACoT and CCoT of each experiment (rounded to 5SF).
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Metric Mild Extreme Total Median of Outliers Mean of Outliers
SDoT
2G 8 0 8 0.24229 0.24503
2GT 10 0 10 0.21766 0.21368
1G 0 18 18 0.083216 0.091756
1GT 3 16 19 0.065154 0.080340
CACoT
2G 4 8 12 238.46 171.4
2GT 2 14 16 149.26 93.85
1G 5 15 20 4.73 2.6
1GT 4 13 17 5.1588 2.3
CCoT
2G 3 10 13 936.54 643
2GT 3 12 15 365.73 236
1G 3 17 20 22.15 11.5
1GT 2 15 17 24.294 10
Table 10: An analysis of the outliers for the SDoT, CACoT and CCoT of each experiment (rounded to 5SF). Mild
outliers are above (Q3 + 1.5IQR), whereas those above (Q3 + 3IQR) are extreme outliers. In all cases, there were
no outliers below (Q1 − 1.5IQR).
8 Analysing the Trade-
Off Between Fitness and
Volatility
As outlined in Section 4.5, this section ascertains
the difference between random and traditional
action when combined with goal-rational action,
and analyses the trade-off between fitness and
volatility.
8.1 Random Action: High Ex-
pected Fitness, High Volatil-
ity
Goal-rational agents that use random action have
a higher expected SDoT, CACoT and CCoT than
those that use the other two types of action; the
exception to this is that the expected SDoT is
lower when agents experience interference with
random action, despite the median still being
larger than the other types of action (Table 5).
Additionally, agents that use random action have
an SDoT with lower variability, and those that
act alone have a CACoT and CCoT with lower
variability than those that use goal-rational or
traditional action. Therefore, when agents do
not experience interference, using random action
means the SDoT, CACoT and CCoT will be pre-
dictably high due to low dispersion around the
mean. This changes drastically when agents are
socially situated agents (Tables 6 and 7), as inter-
ference can cause fitness in agents using random
action to fluctuate often, indicated by a CACoT
and CCoT with very high variability.
In all experiments, the SDoT, CACoT and
CCoT are positively skewed, with random ac-
tion being the least skewed; this means that the
CACoT and CCoT are typically higher than the
other types of action, as the values are more sym-
metrical around the higher means (Tables 6 and
7). It can therefore be said that evolution with
random action is more volatile than goal-rational
or traditional action.
The SDoT, CACoT and CCoT in both goal-
rational and traditional action are highly lep-
tokurtic, meaning there is positive excess kur-
tosis (Tables 5, 6 and 7). The SDoT, CACoT
and CCoT are expected to be less extreme in
agents using random action, but are generally
higher overall.
Agents that use random action have a signifi-
cantly higher expected CACoT and CCoT than
those that use the other two types of action,
as well as a significantly higher expected SDoT
when agents are alone (p < .05, Tables 11 and
12). This indicates that the evolution of agents
using random action is significantly different to
the other types of action, and agents are affected
significantly more by interference.
To summarise, goal-rational agents that use
random action typically have a significantly
higher SDoT, CACoT and CCoT during evolu-
tion than those that use traditional or pure goal-
rational action; this is due to a higher mean and
median, combined with less skew and kurtosis.
There is not enough evidence to say that the
SDoT is significantly greater when agents ex-




Alone Together Alone Together Alone Together
G 6= GR 1.415E-08 0.4993 6.814E-09 6.353E-12 6.146E-09 5.557E-11
G < GR 7.077E-09 0.7515 3.407E-09 3.177E-12 3.073E-09 2.778E-11
G > GR 1.0 0.2496 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 11: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistical Tests Comparing Goal-Rational with Goal-Rational and Random
Action (G-GR). Results are p-values; significant results (p < .05) are bold
Test
SDoT CACoT CCoT
Alone Together Alone Together Alone Together
GT 6= GR 2.643E-11 0.1816 9.769E-11 1.797E-15 9.594E-11 1.473E-14
GT < GR 1.322E-11 0.09081 4.884E-11 8.986E-16 4.797E-11 7.363E-15
GT > GR 1.0 0.9098 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 12: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistical Tests Comparing Goal-Rational and Traditional with Goal-Rational
and Random Action (GT-GR). Results are p-values; significant results (p < .05) are bold
ever both the CACoT and CCoT are significantly
higher. When agents exist alone, the SDoT, CA-
CoT and CCoT have less variability, but in social
environments, the variance is extremely large.
This indicates that evolving and retaining knowl-
edge is much more volatile when agents experi-
ence interference. It can therefore be concluded
that evolution with random action is extremely
volatile compared to the other types of actions
implemented, especially in social environments.
8.2 Balancing the Fitness and
Volatility Trade-Off
The expected fitness after evolution between
goal-rational agents that use traditional action
and those that do not is not significantly differ-
ent (Tables 13 and 14). Goal-rational agents us-
ing random action however evolve to have a sig-
nificantly higher expected fitness than the other
two types of action. All 100 agents achieve a
goal-achieving fitness; a median fitness of 1.0 in-
dicates socially situated agents are expected to
evolve exploitative behaviour, and thus lose the
knowledge and ability to achieve their goals on
their own. Although a higher expected fitness is
desirable, dependency on others would not be de-
sirable if the existence of others is unpredictable,
or the environment is extremely dynamic.
There appears to be a trade-off between ex-
pected fitness and the volatility in evolution in
socially situated agents. The addition of tra-
ditional action significantly reduces the volatil-
ity in evolution in otherwise purely goal-rational
agents, without sacrificing fitness. The addition
of random action however significantly increases
the expected fitness in otherwise purely goal-
rational agents, but this is at the cost of a signif-
icantly increased volatility in evolution; this can
be seen in the kernel density estimations for the
fitness received in each experiment, presented in
Figure 13, and for the SDoT, CACoT and CCoT
of each experiment, presented in Figure 14. It
can therefore be said that incorporating tradi-
tional action into otherwise goal-rational agents
is a logical way to achieve high fitness and low
volatility in evolution, in both agents that are
socially situated and those that are alone.
9 Conclusions, Discussion
and Direction
We have used the River Crossing Dilemma
testbed introduced by [4] to analyse the effects
that various types of social action have on the
way interference is experienced by socially situ-
ated agents. Our results demonstrate that en-
dowing goal-rational agents with the capabil-
ity of traditional action reduces the volatility
in the evolutionary process caused by interfer-
ence. Conversely, when agents evolve alone, no
significant difference in fitness has been found
between purely goal-rational agents and those
that also use traditional action. The main con-




G GT GR G GT GR
mean 0.546 0.534 0.7 0.676 0.669 0.87
variance 0.007155556 0.00570101 0 0.0416404 0.04397879 0.02151515
skewness 1.283171 1.757035 NaN 0.6358369 0.7252645 -0.2817959
kurtosis 2.646527 4.087172 NaN 1.783025 1.830542 1.113205
median 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 1
Table 13: Fitness Statistical Moments and Median
Test
G-GT G-GR GT-GR
Alone Together Alone Together Alone Together
x 6= y 0.3217 0.8379 2.2e-16 2.453e-09 2.2e-16 4.243e-09
x < y 0.8435 0.5836 2.2e-16 1.226e-09 2.2e-16 2.122e-09
x > y 0.1608 0.419 1 1 1 1
Table 14: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistical Tests Comparing Fitness of Goal-Rational, Goal-Rational and Tradi-







































































































Figure 13: Kernel density estimation of the fitness of agents using goal-rational, traditional and random action,
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CCoT Volatility Kernel Density
Figure 14: Kernel density estimation of the (a) SDoT, (b) CACoT and (c) CCoT, of agents using goal-rational,
traditional or random action, evolved together or alone (2G, 2GT, 2GR, 1G, 1GT and 1GR respectively). Note that
the plot scales are not comparable
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action increases resilience to interference when
agents evolve in dynamic, social environments
compared to purely goal-rational agents. Tradi-
tional action was found to reduce the amount of
volatility in the evolutionary process compared
to agents that just use pure goal-rational action
– without sacrificing fitness.
The final contribution shows that traditional
action is indeed conceptually different to simply
adding an element of randomness to the evo-
lution of goal-rational agents. In fact, random
action was found to increase the expected
volatility measured by each of the three new
metrics proposed. Volatility was significantly
higher in socially situated agents, indicating that
random action is very sensitive to interference
and unknown changes in the environment.
Whilst the expected fitness of agents that use
random action is higher than those that use
either goal-rational or traditional action, the
expected volatility also drastically increases. As
a result, agents that use traditional action are
expected to receive a similar fitness to those
that just use goal-rational action, as well as a
significant decrease in volatility compared to
those that use goal-rational or random action.
As socio-technical systems grow in size and
complexity, it is inevitable that systems will indi-
rectly interfere with one another by interacting
with the environment. Related work on inter-
ference utilises knowledge of the existence of in-
terference itself or others, their goals, intentions
or abilities; in reality, this knowledge might not
always be available. As the field of integration
science flourishes, attention is being drawn to
the inherently social nature of today’s systems,
and both the explicit and – more importantly
in this work – the implicit interactions in which
they participate. Consequently, it is becoming
increasingly necessary to enable systems to self-
integrate with others, despite the challenges pre-
sented by an incomplete knowledge of others and
the environment, uncertainty, and the task of in-
teracting in a multitude of ways with other sys-
tems that are heterogeneous in nature. A pre-
cursor to learning about others in one’s environ-
ment and how to interact with them effectively
is to learn about unanticipated changes and how
to manage them; this work is therefore novel by
exploring how agents can mitigate interference
without explicitly knowing about it.
Future work will explore different operational-
isations of traditional action, and other combina-
tions of social action in order to observe their ef-
fects on learning in socially situated agents. Fur-
ther analysis using other metrics such as those
that capture the change in entropy of fitness val-
ues can be utilised to gain more insight into the
effect of social action on the evolutionary process.
[37] argue that, as the complexity of a system
increases, the number of implicit and unintended
interactions will rise as a result; we would there-
fore expect that it will become more challenging
for agents to remain resilient to interference as
the number of other entities in which they may
potentially interact with increases. The results
presented in this work show the impact that
social situatedness can have on an agent’s ability
to achieve goals in the most minimal sense –
i.e. there is only one other agent to interact
with. However, whilst these results provide an
indication of the effect that interference can
have on evolution, this may change drastically
depending on the environment, task, and the
number of agents within the environment; this
will be the topic of future investigation.
We hypothesise that endowing future systems
with social self-awareness will mean systems with
many co-located components are more capable of
dealing with unanticipated and unknown inter-
actions, due to their ability to detect and rea-
son about others and the impact their actions
can have on themselves. According to [7], sys-
tems that showcase social self-awareness are able
to intentionally coordinate with one another; the
agents in this work are therefore not socially self-
aware as they have no capacity to perceive one
another, but are instead tolerant of the conse-
quences of interference to varying degrees. Fur-
ther, traditional action has proven to be a benefi-
cial step towards realising socially self-aware sys-
tems that can manage the impact of the actions
of others on themselves in a socially acceptable
way. This work challenges the assumption that
goal-rationality is sufficient for achieving goals
in social environment, as traditional action sig-
nificantly reduces volatility in the evolutionary
process without sacrificing fitness.
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Würtz. Self-improving system integration-status and
challenges after five years of sissy. In 2018 IEEE 3rd
International Workshops on Foundations and Appli-
cations of Self* Systems (FAS* W), pages 160–167.
IEEE, 2018.
[7] Kirstie Bellman, Jean Botev, Hanno Hildmann,
Peter R. Lewis, Stephen Marsh, Jeremy Pitt,
Ingo Scholtes, and Sven Tomforde. Socially-
Sensitive Systems Design: Exploring Social Po-
tential. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine,
36(3):72–80, 2017.
[8] Kirstie Bellman, Sven Tomforde, and Rolf P Würtz.
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and Rolf Würtz. An organic computing perspective
on self-improving system interweaving at runtime. In
2016 IEEE International Conference on Autonomic
Computing (ICAC), pages 276–284. IEEE, 2016.
[85] U.S. CFTC and U.S. SEC. Findings regarding the
market events of May 6, 2010. Technical report,
2010.
[86] Paul A.M. van Lange, Jeff Joireman, Craig D. Parks,
and Eric Van Dijk. The psychology of social dilem-
mas: A review. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 2013.
[87] Carel P van Schaik and Judith M Burkart. Social
learning and evolution: the cultural intelligence hy-
pothesis. Philosophical transactions of the Royal
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences,
366(1567):1008–16, 4 2011.
[88] Lev Semenovich Vygotsky. Mind in society: The de-
velopment of higher psychological processes. Harvard
university press, 1978.
[89] Guy H. Walker, Neville A. Stanton, Dan Jenkins,
Paul Salmon, Mark Young, and Amerdeep Aujla.
Sociotechnical Theory and NEC System Design. In
Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics,
pages 619–628. Springer, 2007.
[90] Jane X. Wang, Edward Hughes, Chrisantha Fer-
nando, Wojciech M. Czarnecki, Edgar A. Duéñez
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